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Industrial Relations in Kiribati 
Kevin Hince * 
This paper examines recent ,developments in industrial relations in Kiribati and 
questions the appropriateness of continuing with an indurtrial relations legislative framework, 
procedures and institutions that are a legacy of colonial rule. In r,ecent years there have 
been moves to revamp this in keeping with local practices. Alrlwugh the early period after 
independence brought a union-gover~nt confrontation, r.ecent responses suggest that 
Kiribati may move towards a more pluralist, .tripartite approach to industrial relations 
processes and institutions in the 1990s. 
Introduction 
Industrial relations in Kiribati in the 1990s is still conducted primarily within the 
legislative framework, procedures and institutions devolved from the colonial past. Robens 
( 1964) outlines how such legislation, pfocedures and institutions were transplanted across the 
globe by virtue of the policies of the British Colonial ,Office and peripatetic colonial officers. 
Transplantation from the the home country or the more populous African and Asian colonies 
to the micro-states of the Pacific has been questioned (Hince, 1971). The relevance of such 
transplanted ideas in the post-colonial independence ~era of those micro-states is even more 
questionable. 
Kiribati, which had been the Gilbert Islands part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
colony became independent from Great Britain in 1979. However, the government of 
independent Kiribati has retained a similar paternalistic attitude to labour relations as that of 
the colonial predecessors, and continued to work within the inherhed legislative framework. 
Little effon has been made by government ro question, alter or adapt pre-independence 
legislation. Funher, there has been minimal overt encouragement and recognition for a 
positive role for trade unions. The response by gov~emment to the trauma of extended strike 
action in 1980 by a key union, the Botakin Karik:irakean Aroia Tan Makuri union (BKA'TM), 
was a revision of procedures to tighten administrative control, and liemove unions further from 
the processes of dispute resolution, both in determining tet ms and conditions of employment, 
and in processing grievances between employees and management that arise from time to 
time. This paper outlines the contemporary situation in respect to industrial r~elations, and 
identifies areas of current debate, approaching such issues via an understanding of key 
historical, especially post-independence, events . 
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The next section of this paper introduces the g~eographic and economic context within 
which industrial relations in Kiribati occurs. The following sections introduce the ~extensive 
legislative basis inherited from the colonial gov~emment, the key events and outcomes of the 
BKA TM strikes of 1980, the perceived inequities of these outcomes and further pressure £or 
change that developed later in the 1980s. At the macto-level the ongoing debate can be 
viewed as a contest between the pluralism of organised labour and government in respect to 
the establishment of key national issues, (or the non-involvement of organised labour in such 
areas). Similarly, at the micro-level the debate relates to the primacy of managerial roles 
versus the pluralism of worker/union participation in grievance processing and operational 
aspects of business. Neither of these debates are unique to Kiribati, for both are central to 
the fo1n1 of gov·emment/management/union relationships in the modem world. However, the 
context in which the debate occurs is differen~ if not unique . 
The co:ntext 
Kiribati is a micro-state in the truest sense of the terrn, except perhaps in respect to 
geographic area. Thirty-three islands, a land ·mass of 810 square kilometres, are scatt~ered 
across 3.5 million square kilometres of ocean, ex~nding some 3,000 kilometres east-w·est and 
2,000 kilometres north-south, spanning the equator and the international date line. The 
r;epublic comprises three main island groups, the Gilbert Islands, the Line Islands and the 
Phoenix Islands, and one isolated island, Banaba (fotmerly Ocean Island). All the islands, 
except Banaba, are atolls. Kiritimati (Christmas Island) in the Line Islands is 3,500 
kilometres from Tarawa, the capital, located on South Tarawa Island in the Gilberts chain. 
The total population of Kiribati (1985) is 64,000 of whom 61,000 are in the Gilberts ~oup, 
including 21,000 on South Tarawa. Approximately 95 percent of the population is 
Micronesian. 
Economic dualism is a feature of productiv~e activity and a monetised economy exists 
only in urban Tarawa and on Kiritimati Island Public enterprise dominates the cash economy 
of urban Tarawa, and K.iritimati Island caters for a limited amount of tourism. A 
manufacturing sector is practically non-existent, and most private ~enterprise (taxis, 
movie-showing, food-vendors) is concentrated on South Tarawa. Exports are basically copra 
and marine products, whilst imports comprise a wide range of food, consumer and capital 
goods. Employment in the cash sector is 6,769 (1985) with two-thirds of these in South 
Tarawa. Nearly half of those employed in the cash sector are in "public administration", a 
further third in "wholesale and retail trading" and "transport and communication" (each 
dominated to date by government ownership). Manufacturing ·employment comprises two 
per~cent of employment, and agriculture and fishing seven percent 
Public sector employment encompasses the administrativ~e public service, public works 
activities (power, water, sewerage, post and telecommunication, civil aviation, roads, port 
activities), health, education, and trading activities such as Air Tungaru, the shipping 
corporation and the Kiribati Oil Company. Most paid agricultural and fishing employment 
is in the government sector. The Sixth Development Plan for Kiribati (1987-91) refers to this 
concentration of employment, and implicitly identifies the core contemporary industrial 
relations issue for the counrry as one of "control'", or alternatively a struggle for panicipatory 
involv~ement against such unilateral "control".. The Plan (p. 106) records (my emphasis): 
Industrial Relations in Kiribati 59 
Within the monetary sector the largest employer is the public sector. Through a national wage system 
it also controls tlu! pay and conditioru of employees in public corporations and companies. 
Approximately 70 percent of those employed in the monetary sector are employed in this ''controlled'' 
sector. Most of this employment is centred on South Tarawa. 
Industrial relations and wage employment issues, and strike activity, frrst emerged in 
the phosphate mining operations of Ocean Island. However, phosphate mining ceased in 1978 
and such issues, as with employment in the monetary sector, are now centred on the urbanised 
area of South Tarawa. 
Industrial relations legislation 
Three key statutes provide the legislative base for industrial relations, the Trade Union 
Ordinance Ch. 97 (1946), the Employment Ordinance Ch. 30 (1966} and the Industrial 
Relations Code Ch. 35 (1974). All are l~egacies of the colonial era. 
(i) Trade Union OrdiMnce 
The Trade Union Ordinance provides for the registtation of trade unions. A minimum 
of seven workers can fotm a union. Registration is compulsory, and requires the submission 
of rules covering, among other ,matters, the name of the union, the objects, the provisions for 
making, altering or rescinding rules, appoinanent and removal of officers, and the keeping 
and accessibility of accounts. A list of titles and names of the officers must also be provided. 
Registration accords legitimacy to pursue the purposes of the organisation, together with 
responsibilities of financial accountability of officials. The protections of the Trade Union 
Act (UK) 1871 are ~extended to Kiribati unions by this ordinance. That is, the Ofdinance 
provides protection against prosecution for criminal conspiracy for action taken by unions, 
merely because the action is in restraint of trade. Similarly, the purpose of any trade union 
shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade be deemed unlawful. Funher, 
there is the protection originating in the Trade Disputes Act (UK) 1906 of immunity from 
action for tort, and that action taken in combination in contemplation of furtherance of a trade 
dispute shall not be liable as conspiracy. The Ordinanc~e also provides the basic provisions 
of freedom of association. 
The Trade Union Ordinance was first introduced in 1946, not as part of any specific 
plan to encourage unionism, but as pan of a general policy of the United Kingdom 
government to place such legislation on the statute books of all dependencies. No unions 
were registered under the ordinance until the 1970s. 
The fli'St union to operate in Kiribati was the Civil Services Association fo1n1ed in 
1953 as an affiliate of the British Civil Service Association. Both local and expaoiate civil 
servants were members, and the association acted as an in-house consultative mechanism. 
It was not regisrered under the local legislation until 1974 (and 'then as the Public Employees 
Association). Increasing political consciousness, and the associated debates about 
independence and the possibility of separation from the Ellice Islands during the 1970s, were 
also key catalysts for the emergence and growth of trade unions. A most important first was 
that taken in 1971 with the founation of the BKA'TM (first registered in 1972) as a general 
union for employees in both the public and private sectors. It emerged from a linking of two 
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separate associations fotxned in the late 1960s, the Public Works Depai unent Staff Association 
and the Wholesale Society Trade Union. The immediate catalyst was the prospective 
reorganisation of all government trading activity into the Gilben and Ellice Islands 
Development Authority (GEIDA). That reorganisation occurred in 1972. The Authority, at 
the time of fotrnation, employed two-thirds of the paid work·-force of the country. 
By 1976 six unions had ·registered. In 1982 five unions became founding members 
of the Kiribati Trade Union Congress (KTU~C), which in time affiliated with the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Table 1 lists the ttade unions operating in 1989, 
together with estimates of membership. 
Table l:T~ade Union Membership - 1989 
Aia Union Taan Akawa !-Kiribati 
Bank Workers Union 
BKATM Union 
Fanning Plantation Workers Union 
Kiribati Co-operativ,e Wholesale Society Workers Union 
Kiribati Is. & Tuvalu Overseas Seamen's Union (KIROSU) 
Kiribati National Union of Teachers (KNUT) 
Kiribati Nurses Association (KNA) 
Kiritimati Is. Federation Workers Union 
Nanolelei Co-Operative Society Workers Union (Retailers) 
Pre-School T~eachers ·union 
Public Employees Association (PEA) 
Rural Workers Union - Butaritari Island 
Rwal Workers Union -Makin Island 
80 
35 
450 
70 
70 
2,000 
300 
65 
210 
30 
45 
400 
250 
100 
----------
4,105 
- --
Source: Figmes supplied by KTU,C modified by assessment of verbal evidence 
assembled during field work. 
The union membership figures of table 1 are indicative, or approximate, rather than 
precise. For example, the figure of 2,000 members for the Overseas Seamen's Union 
app~oximates the number of registered seamen. At any one time only 20-25 percent of these 
would be employed and paying £ees. Also the Kiritimati Is. Federation Workers Union had 
become inoperative by mid-1991.. Nevertheless, ev,en if the aggregate figure is discounted to 
the level of 2000-2500 members, this represents a membership penetration rate in the range 
of 30-40 percent. The Overseas Seamen's Union is one of two private sector unions, the 
other is the Bank Union. Accordingly the union membership penetration rat,e in the public 
sector is ,even higher, in the range of 40-50 percent. The data, despite the potential 
discrepancies, does indicat~e a continuing union presence, and a committnent, especially 
amongst urban employees in the monetised sector, to the concept of unionism. 
The KTUC operates with one paid full-time officer, an Education Officer (who 
undertakes most of the administrative tasks) and one office support worker. Other officers 
are honorary and pan-time. Funding from overseas agencies is critical in the operating budget 
• 
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of the Congress. One aim of the KTUC is to rationalise the organisation of unions, moving 
towards a federal relationship of unions within a single structure. An interim step of 
rationalisation to five or six sector unions is currently at the planning stage. The BKA TM 
and the Overseas Seamen's Union are the only individual unions to have a full-time paid 
official. 
(ii) The Employment Ordi1UJnce 
The Employment Ordinance, pan of the package of colonial labour legislation, was 
introduced to the Gilbert Islands colony in 1966. The onlinance regulates the employment 
of women and children, prohibits forc,ed labour, provides for written contracts of employment 
and regulates recruiting of labour. Standalids of mtioning, sanitary arrangements, housing and 
medical care are elaboratecL together with procedures protecting the payment of labour. A 
minimum wage can be established under the Act The office of Commissioner of Labour 
(replaced by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Labour (MINTIL) at independence) was 
established to administer the onlinance. 
The ordinance has provided a base or 'minimum set of employment conditions, and 
means of control against the worst cases of exploitation. However, it is argued (Awira, 1988, 
p.5) that the Employment Ordinance was an attempt by tpe administration to retain control 
of the deteunination of ~employment conditions and forestall the creation and development of 
unions. Certainly the recofd of government since independence has been to exercise such 
'control'. The dominance of public sector employment together with the post-independence 
emergence of centralised fo1mulations of wage and employment conditions under the title of 
National Conditions of Service, has meant the Employment Ordinance base relates primarily 
to the smaU proportion of employees in the private sector, (excluding overseas seamen where 
provisions are established externally under the International Transport Federation code}, and 
particular I y rural labour . 
(iii) The Industrial Relations Cotk 
By the early 1970s an estimated 60 percent of the urban workforce were members of 
trade unions (Awira, 1988, p.6). Moreover, this was a time when the debate about the 
political future of the colony was developing, and local political leaders sought issues and 
constituencies. Employment conditions was one such issue and public employees (and trade 
unions of public employees) were an imponant constituency. The Industrial Relations Code, 
was introduced in 197 4 to provide procedures for processing the trade (industrial) disputes 
that began to develop with increasing frequency in this period. 
Under the onlinance trade disputes can be reported to the Minister who then has 
discretion whether to recognise the existence of that dispute, and then to choose a means to 
process the matter. If a trade dispute is recognised six options exist for further action. First, 
if the Minister believes that inadequate use of existing machinery has been made or 
inadequate negotiation has take place, the Minister may refer the matter for further attention 
by that machinery, or negotiation. Second, the Minister may refer the matter for further 
negotiation, making proposals to the parties about a possible basis for settlement The third 
option is to provide for conciliation; the fourth, refer the matter to an arbitration tribunal, and 
the fifth, refer the matter to a board of inquiry. The final option is to refer the matter to an 
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Incomes Commission. Further sections of the ordinance detail the composition, structures and 
operation of each of these options. 
Clearly the provisions are comprehe:nsiv~e, but there lies, as illustrated later, the source 
of a critical contemporary problem for industrial relations in Kiribati. The provision is for 
a series of options, or alternative choices. Moreover, dispute settlement does not encompass 
a progression tmough processes, but potentially a sequence of choices. For example, if the 
initial method chosen, perhaps conciliation, fails, then a further choice of options can be 
~exercised, perhaps arbitration or an inquiry. In addition the need for choice is multiplied 
within each of the primary procedures. For example, if the process of arbitration is selected 
there follows the options of sole arbitrator, an arbitrator assisted by one or more assessors, 
or one or mo~e arbitrators selected from a pool agteed upon by employers and employees (or 
the trade union). Then the choice or selection of personnel need be made. All choices are 
made by a political office-holder, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Labour. 
Strikes, lockouts and boycotts are illegal before pfocedures are exhausted. A strike 
in relation to an issue already settled (in the opinion of the Minister) by an unexpired 
agreement or an award is also illegal. Penalties of fmes and imprisonment can be levied 
against individuals participating in an unlawful strike, lockout or boycott. The ~Code provides 
for a secr;et ballot to be taken prior to a strike, if the number of employees involved exceeds 
50.. A decision to strike requires a two-thirds majority of those ,eligible to vote. The ballot 
is conducted by 'the ~Commissioner of Labour (subsequently MINTIL) under a set of rules 
prescribed in regulations A section of the ,Code dealing with Essential Services further 
restricts action and increases penalties in such instances. 
The Industrial Relations Code was introduced to manage emerging conflicts. It is an 
all embracing starute transplanted by colonial administrators, containing elements of choioe 
that focussed power in the hands of the ~ey official, the colonial administrator and 
subsequently the relevant Minister.. In turn, the Code created further conflicts, as these 
choices were exercised. The BKATM ·- government dispute in 1980 is the classic case study 
of these developments. 
The 1980 BK.A TM strikes and outcomes 
Although the Trade Union Onlinance has been in place since 1946, and trade unions 
had developed, albeit without overt government encouragement, very few collective 
agreements have been made in Kiribati. One such agreement was signed in 1975 with a 
union representing plantation workers at Kiritimati Island, another in 1978 with the British 
Phosphate Commission covering workers on Banaba (Ocean Island). Prior to independence 
tetms and conditions of employment in the public sector were determined initially by the 
administration, sometimes after consultation with the ~Civil Service Association, sometimes 
after a consultant's repon, and sometimes after industrial action by workers. For ~example, 
a two-day s~e by unestablished staff in Tarawa in November 1962 expressed dissatisfaction 
over a salary award (Pacific Islands Monthly, December 1962). In 1974 a strike by waterside 
workers preceded ,concession of a bonus system associated with cargo handling. 
A tension that exists in emerging and newly independent states is the relationship of 
trade unions, trade union leaders and politics. In Kiribati the emerging unions of the 1970s 
w~ere important power bases for local politicians, and for challenges to the colonial status quo. 
During this period the BKA TM rallied the indigenous public sector employees, and was an 
• 
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imponant source of opposition supporting the interests of workers against the state as an 
employer. The passage of the Industrial Relations Code in 1974 was a direct result of 
increasing union militancy, consistent pursuit of improvements in pay and conditions of 
service, and increased protection of members against indiscriminate redundancies and 
premature retirement. 
The union movement, particularly the BKA TM, also provided a base of political 
opposition within the established House of Assembly, both before and after the attainment of 
intetnal self-government in 1977. But the election of this (apparently) union-supponing 
opposition group to government in 1978 was to be disappointing and frustrating. Several 
union leaders became pan of the new government, one, the original organiser of the BKA TM 
(Abete Merang) became Minister of Labour and Manpower, another, Minister of Works. 
Ieremia Tabai, Chief Minister in this last pre-independence government, and later to become 
the founding President (and government leader) of the independent Kiribati, had also been 
closely associated with the trade unions during the period in which he was opposition leader 
in the House of Assembly. After independence the Tabai government first resiled from close 
contact and involvement with the BKA TM, and then seriously challenged the actions and role 
of that union. 
Within the public sector a codified National Conditions of Service had developed and 
during 1978 - 1980 various pr;ocedures, an overseas consultant's revi~ew and report, an 
Incomes Commission and arbitration, were utilised in an attempt to resolve the direction and 
substance of change in this code. As time passed disputation incxeased rather than 
diminished Argument about substance, the outcomes from each process, was but one aspect 
of the disputation. Delays in ministerial action, the choice of procedures at each point and 
the selection of personnel to participate in each procedure, individually and collectively, added 
to the scope of disputation. Further disputation arose over varying interpretations as to 
whether outcomes of specific processes (e.g., a repon) was a set of recommendations subject 
to further negotiation, or a non-negotiable set of tetms and conditions. 
Eventually a one-day unlawful strike, and a five-week lawful stoppage, occurred. 
A wira describes the events of the latter strike in detail, but the atmosphere is well 
encapsulated in the following extract: 
The strike went on for five weeks and it proved a nighunare experience for the whole 
country. The powerhouse attendants withdrew their labour and the police mechanics took 
charge of powerhouse ope~ation. The shipping and pon services were disrupted, including 
the servicing of overseas ships. Arson and sabotage of public property were rampant, 
several buildings were set on ftre and a trade wtion member was shot by police during a 
night chase. The KG [Kiriban government) mttoduced ~emergency measures, including the 
recruibnent of extra policeman, during the strike to combat militant action by the union. 
The union members spent most ~of their time fJShing 10 suppon their families, however the 
loss of pay to the strikers began to lake its toll from lhe thiJ;d week. (Awira, 1988, p. 38) 
.. Direct political involvement in the fonn of a directive to dismiss 500 striking workers 
further exacerbated the situation. Then, despite the lawfulness of the strike, the Minister 
refused to recognise these dismissals as a rrade dispute under the Industrial Relations Code. 
Protest was to no avail and the soike collapsed as a crushing defeat for the BKA TM. 
In the aftexrnath of these events government moved to address the perceived 
weaknesses of the Industrial Relations Code, and inter alia took measures intended to increase 
employee input into problem solving at the workplace, and to establish a pro-active 
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mechanism for considering and deteuuining changes to the National Conditions of Service. 
Two committees were established, the Management Consultative Committee (later 
called the Joint Consultativ~e Committee or JCC) and the Standing Revi~ew ~Committee (SRC). 
'The JCC is an umbrella tetm for committees, established in Ministries and government trading 
agencies, with a bfoad consultative role. In particular, it provides a forum for discussion of 
ways of improving efficiency, productivity, salety measures and working conditions, for 
sharing infoitnation about policies and decisions which affect the workforce, for an exchange 
of views on all aspects of the work of the organisation, for discussion (but not determination) 
of claims affecting conditions of service of either all employees or a specific ~oup of 
employees, and to handle workplace grievances (not resolved by discussion at the 
employee/management level). The Pe~onnel Officer, Divisional or Section H~eads and the 
Secretary (Ministries) or Manager (trading activities) represent management on the committee. 
Employee representation comprises one or two persons from each division or large section of 
the organisation. 
The SRC, the second level of the structure, comprises four senior public servants, the 
Secretary to the Cabinet (head of the Civil Service)., the Secretary to the Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Labour, the Secretary for Finance, and the Deputy Secretary (Personnel Division). 
The main ongoing task of this committee is to recommend to Cabinet changes in the national 
conditions of service referred to it from the Joint Consultative Committee structure, and 
responsible senior officers. 
While in principle consultative processes were improved by these structural changes., 
several areas of concern continued. In particular, the role of trade unions in the processes, the 
insertion of a further range of procedures to be utilised before one or more of the multiple 
choice procedures of the Industrial Relations Code might be implemented, and assessing the 
tokenism or reality of the consultation, became pan of an on-going debate. 
Pressures for further reform 
A minimum degree of oven industrial strife characterised the years immediately 
following the 1980 BKATM strikes and establishment of the consultative review committees. 
It is agreed that the lengthy st:rike was a traumatic event in a small developing micro-state. 
It is not accepted, however, that disagreement and disputation disappeared. Pressure for 
further refotm continued. Rebounding from the disaster of 1980 the BKA TM slowly 
re-established its own position, and then worked to develop a co-ordinated trade union 
approach through the fotmation of the Kiribati Trade Union Congress (KTUC). The BKA TM 
and the KTUC, to a lesser extent, were central to the on-going campaign for further refonns, 
especially arguing for a positive role for unions in industrial relations processes, and, more 
significantly, as a partner in national development Teachers and nurses unions, which had 
refused to suppon the BKA TM in the 1980 strike, were ultimately convinced of the need for 
refotm and affiliat~ed with the KTUC. 
A seminar held in Tarawa at the University of the South Pacific Extension ~centre on 
5-7 June 1989 was an important and visible step in this campaign. The Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Labour (MINTIL) joined the BKA TM and KTUC in sponsoring the seminar. 
Funding support was provided from the New Zealand Public Service Association. 
Twenty-seven participants were involved. Sixteen of these represented the main trade unions, 
and eleven were personnel officers/managers from a range of government ministries and 
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Iridin& apncies. The author had been invited to chair the senJnar, actina in a 
flcilitator/lesource person role. Dr Anote Tong, Dilector of the Atoll Research Unit of tbe 
USP on Tarawa was secretary to the seurinar. 1be seminar wu conducted in English and 
Oilbenese with ttanslation. The usc of the Gilbutese language wu imponant in adding to 
the range of conttibutions, especially f1om bade union speakers. 
Although the seminar had been the initiative of the unions, the eventual co-sponsorship 
by MINTIL, and the broad participation of goveiJnnent pcnonnel reflected government 
acceptance of the relevance of the initiative, if not of the view about the need for and possible 
direction of change. MINTn.. reinforecd each of these points; the fint by presenting an 
opening address and welcoming discussion, and the second by suggesting that, as a matter of 
substance, son-e fine-tuning of the JCC structure was all that miJbt be needed. Funher 
position papers were presented by a representative of the Ministry and the President of the 
KTUC. The Ministry argued for a clear delineation of role between the Labour Officers of 
MINTa and the Public Service Conauaission (PSC), in respect to the administration of the 
public service and responsibility for public employment 
The bade union position was a case for more radical change. It argued that the 1980 
BKA TM disputation had demonstrated the weakness of the multiple choice mechanism of the 
Industrial Relations Code, and that the Code required drastic revision. Funher the JCC fonnat 
had operated to minimise union involveucn~t and the SRC (where key recommendations 
developed) refused to allow union inpuL These committees it has been noted, acted to create 
new te1•••s and conditions of employnor:n~t and process grievances arising from the application 
of existing teJ•ns and conditions. The union position noted thlee main areas of concern. 
Firs~t if the trade unions could not participate in the processing of grievances until JCC 
procedures had been exhausted, the chances of a constructive and positive role for the unions 
in dispute resolution was minimal. Inevitably the union was forced to challenge results rather 
than pursue murually acceptable solutions. Secon~ in so far as the JCC/SRC structure 
established new tei• • as and conditions, it acted as a substitute for collective bargaining. Third. 
the isolation of bade unions f1om policy making at the SRC and government level, failed to 
recognise the willingness and capacity of the unions to be involved in tripartite consultative 
planning in the national intcresL Without decrying the importance of the third issue, the 
seminar, perhaps prag•natically, accepted a more limited role and focussed on a review of the 
processes of dispute resolution at the micro-level. 
Initially the disparate position of the key parties, with the unions focussing on major 
refo1m and government/management on oiling the wheels of the current institutions and 
proccdu•es, c1eated an air of potential futility. The breakthrough came in an unexpected way, 
when the participants separated into groups to discuss the traditional i-Kiribati approach to 
resolution of family conflicts. If discussion did not resolve disputes within a family then 
eldets of the family would bccot~a.c involved in the process. In the case of disputes between 
families another pe1son or group flom the village would be available to provide assistance. 
If the dispute could potentially affect the entire village community then settlement would 
involve the "old nen" sitting in the Maneaba (na.ceting house) with each family having a voice 
through their rep1esentative (booti.) If apecfluent was not reached a pronouncement would 
be made by the "old men" sitting in council. 
The seminar recognised that processes of negotiation, conciliation/mediation and 
arbitration we1e central to the traditions of dispute resolution for the i-Kiribati. Moreover, 
there was an identification of a specific process for a particular type of dispute and, if needed, 
a natm"a1 progression of stages towards final resolution. 
' 
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The multiple choice of processes bequeathed by the colonial legislation was a complex 
antithesis of a simpler and predetenuined set of processes. The Maneaba, the meeting house, 
was the traditional institutional framework for each of these processes, indicating a role for 
a predetetnrined acceptable institutional facility ~or dispute resolution. It is interesting to note 
that in traditional Kiribati society a failure of the discussions and decisions of the Maneaba 
to resolve the issue could lead to outright conflict (fighting) between the families. With some 
humour, but clear understanding of the coercive similarities, participants equated the modem 
notion of , the strike' to this fighting, suggesting that the availability, potential, and ultimat~e 
threat of a withdrawal of labour could play a key role in provoking an earlier settl~ement. 
It was at this point that the complexities of the Industrial Relations Code and the 
unilateralism of the JCC and SRC welie recognised, and the focus of the seminar shifted to 
establishing an agreed basis of change. Key recommendations, which emerged as a consensus 
were: 
(i) government should be asked to review the Industrial Relations Code, with the 
assistance of the ILO and in consultation with the KTUC. In the review, 
amongst other things, particular consideration should be giv~en to the nature of 
a sequential process of dispute resolution ~combining ~conciliation/mediation and 
arbitration, should discussions (negotiations) break down. Reterence was made 
to the link of such processes to more traditional i-Kiribati practice. 
(ii) representation of the KTUC on the SRC (or a sub-committee) as a ,means of 
representation for views of workers. Further, that the willingness and potential 
of the KTUC to contribute positively as a partner in the development of 
Kiribati be noted, and opportunities for such contribution explored. While the 
highest priority union issue, the establishment of fo1n1al recognition of 
collective bargaining processes, was not endorsed, the issue of a more positive 
and accepted role for unions was apparent. 
(iii) the development of a standardised procedure which would ensure workers 
could el~ect their representativ~e to the JCC, and that legislative protection be 
accorded workers bringing grievances to the foxrnal committ~ee process. 
(iv) that a precise interpretation of the power of the PSC be sought (if necessary 
from the Kiribati High Coun) especially in respect to clarification of apparent 
conflict between the Industrial Relations Code, the role of MINTIL, and 
constitutional processes in ~espect to the Public Service Commission. 
In the course of discussions it had become clear that the KTUC seriously questioned 
the legitimacy and ~effectiveness of the JCC as a ~channel for workers grievances. The KTUC 
were particularly critical of the frequent practice of management sel~ecting worker 
representatives. However, management participants, especially from the trading agencies, 
expressed support for the JCC process, and after discussion it was agreed that the consultative 
process did serve a useful role. The focus of the third recommendation was therefore on 
improving rather than abandoning the framework. 
The basis of the fourth recommendation was the recognition that the resolution of 
several identified grievances had been delayed, because of inter-ministry rivalry. The PSC 
had been established under the Constitution with the responsibility for the administtation of 
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public en~ploy••&ent. The PSC aacl rilbtallld power iDa of 
.... of sucb en•ployux;n~ Tbe UDioD, by vfaw1 of 
tb1 MIN'I'II., ar&ued that tbe pmccdanea of tbe Reladoas should be 
• ID appeal path. When conu my points of debated at tbe die 
for a acsolution was idenlified, llld tbe to above 
Sooa after the seauinar tbe of Tncle,lndlllby llld Labour indicated &rQprance 
m the validity of tbe recon•n+endaliona, without exptealinl a to chanp. To dace 
autbins final bas happened, but 1989 wu tbe of of tbe 1ellth anniversary of 
~ and in 1990 Kiribati balled tbe Soutb Fmun•. 
electioDs, more critical than noa••••l because Jereania Tabai, the founding P.tesidcmt, was 
excluded by the constitution flom seekins a further teim of office, wu a central issue dn• iq 
1990. Such events we1e individually, and collectively, of much peater polidcal sipificance 
than tbe outcon ;e of the senrinar. 
Anote Tong Oetter to author, September 1989) fmesbadowed a degree of inactivity, 
writing: 
•-, · · ·d .. · · · · ..._. m· .a~ -..:n be ...~._ 
... unsSS •ncenuves •e J*OVI -eu or a CIISIS occ•as ttll ..... IIIIU'I'W ww loiiMill 
iD lbe · future. ID to b fuadau it wiD be 
to coarinue to p~eSP•te die • J*liculady while tbe of the commitments 
a lbe IUUMD 
S01•e info1•••al change did occur with the appoinh•cnt of an ad hoc conciliator to seek 
resolution in several long standing disputes which had been discussed at the seminar, and 
provided the itupetus for the fourth MCOmmendation above. Such action was a step, albeit a 
small step, in recognising conciliation rather than unilateralisrn, as a preferred procedure in 
processing industrial disputes in Kiribati. 
A bade union seminar, conducted in Tarawa in Feb1uary 1990, under the auspices of 
tbe International Confedetation of F1ec Trade Unions (Asia and Pacific Regional Office), 
~evisitcd the tbe••-e of refmm of industrial relations, thus indicating that the issue bad neither 
been resolved, nor forgotten. The se•nin•r add~sed tbe enuaing issue of tbe hnpact 
of 'privadsation' of industrial relations in Kiribati. The Sixth National Developrnent Plan 
(1987-1991) had fo1eshadowed such developn-cnts. In 1988 owne1ship ofteleco•nmunications 
bad been ttansfe11ed ftom the Ministry of Transp01t and Conamunications to a 
govmnruent-owned company, and management bad been entrusted to an overseas co1poration. 
By early 1990 plans for private sector equity participation in telecommunications bad been 
developed. In addition, a number of other govemnat entelptises, the govmnnacnt printery, 
the airline, shipyard, foodstuff ianp01ting and cop1a exporting, were in various stages of 
restructuring prior to a potential progression to privatisation. The union seminar identified 
issues of concern, called for an education and awareness campaign a••10ngst workers, argued 
for a consultation process involvingnnions and govmnncn~ and began to enunciate ce1lain 
rights (no ~dancy, preseivation of wages aDd wmlring conditions, retraining etc) that it 
believed should be pro~ted 
. Despite Ano1e Tong's pessimism a process for considering change has been 
implenlfCnted. The Intel national Labour Organisation bad been involved for several yeus in 
a review of the ~equirements for bcalth aDd safety legislation, and reco ndations were 
made to gOVCIIIIICDt On this matter in early 1990. The 00 WU then invited to review the 
Industrial Relations Code, and a visit by an ILO Mission for that purpose occurred later that 
year. The K1UC and the Otamber of Cot• .. •+ace wme consulted. A rep01t was delivmed to 
aove~nn+cnt early in 1991, in tbe last months of the Tabai govemnaent. The election 
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campaign, a new government and President, has delayed consideration of the repon. At the 
time of writing (December 1991) tile report itself has not been made public. One major 
change that is anticipated is the establishment of a clearly defined route for processing 
grievances, with an Employment Court as a definitiv,e fmal st~ep. 'The Court will be pan-time, 
and the expectation is that unions and the Chamber of ~Commerce will be consulted about the 
appoinnnent. 
It was not expected that the llD mission would recommend the adoption of a fotntal 
process of collective bargaining to deteunine wages and conditions of employment in the 
public sector, or the inclusion of the KTUC in the procedures of the Standing Review 
Committee. The inference left by the Mission during discussions with the KTUC was that 
such steps were considered matters for government to decide, as and when appropriate. 
Nevertheless, issues such as the role of trade unions, and the relevance of consultation in 
national development and macro-change, are now pan of an open public debate. Since 1987 
the overall degree of change has been minimal and the speed of change has been slow, but 
the direction of change has been inclusive rather than divisive. The responses have been 
different than in the period during, and immediately following, the BKA'TM-government 
confrontation of the early 1980s. An optimism exists that a pluralist, tripartite approach to 
economic planning, to changes in work organisation, and to industrial relations processes and 
institutions, will be adopted as the pattern for Kiribati in the approach to the 21st century. 
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